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Abstract
We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model to address the effects of tech-
nological progress on immigrant skill composition. Our results from this positive
model suggest that neutral and skill-biased technological change imply essentially
different immigration policies. On the one hand, skill-neutral change implies an
immigrant skill distribution that is dominated by the native skill distribution; on
the other hand, skill-biased change implies an immigrant over-representation at the
top and bottom of the skill distribution. This result is interesting because of its un-
expected nature. It implies that if technology changes as it has in the last decades
and education has an increasing cost, then it is optimal to allow some low-skill im-
migration along with high-skill immigration. We show consistency of our model’s
predictions with data from the United States and Canada.
Keywords: immigration, education, complementarity, technological change, mo-
bility, skill bias.
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“The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the
greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgement with which it is anywhere
directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.”
Adam Smith
1 Introduction
While all existing theories on the subject suggest that immigration is either high-skilled or
low-skilled, existing data for at least two of the traditional destination countries (Canada
and USA) shows that immigration occurs at both ends of the skill distribution, as Figure 1
shows.1 In addition to providing the evidence, this paper introduces a model where skill-
bias and strong risk aversion may induce the aforementioned pattern.
In what follows, this section explains the two main strands of immigration theories,
which are sometimes referred to as supply-driven and demand-driven theories. Consider
first the well-known Borjas-Roy theory, which is a prototypical supply-driven theory.2 In
this static framework, labor units are homogeneous and therefore perfectly substitutable,
with the logarithm of units provided (and hence the logarithm of wage) being proportional
to skill plus ability, which is normally distributed. The different levels of inequality across
countries of origin then induces emigration of either the low-skilled (given high inequality)
or the high-skilled (given low inequality). It has been shown by Chiquiar and Hanson
(2005) that this characterization is inaccurate. They show this in the case of Mexican
immigrants in the USA, which is non-trivial in size; the great majority is drawn from the
middle of the Mexican income distribution. Moreover, the Borjas-Roy model, as all of
the supply-driven models (by definition), assumes there are no immigration restrictions
enforced by the governments of destination countries. This goes against widely recognized
facts, especially among traditional destination countries.3
There has been a surge of demand-driven models in response to this last evident flaw.
The political economy models by Benhabib (1996) and Ortega (2005) are probably the
most representative of this strand. The latter concludes that at one point in time the
incoming immigrant’s skill composition is either dominantly high-skilled or dominantly
1Figure 1 displays the distributions of school attainment for natives (individuals born on US soil) and
recent immigrants (individuals who were born outside the US but entered within the five years prior to
the 2000 Census). All individuals are 30 years or older.
2Borjas (1987).
3The USA, for example, according to its official immigration policy, spends a non-trivial amount of
resources on border enforcement in addition to favoring high-skilled immigration. Canada and Australia
both have official point-systems for immigrants as well. See OECD (2001).
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Figure 1: Skill Distributions, 30+ years old individuals, 2000 Census USA
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Figure 2: Immigrant College Participation, 1940-2000 Censuses
low-skilled. Although the latter case may be accurate under some raw measures of skill,4
there are two other major problems with this approach that have been pointed out by
Gomez-Ruano (2007). First, it contradicts the facts when trying to explain the actual,
increasing college participation of immigrants observed in the data (see Figure 2).5 Sec-
ond, it remains silent with respect to the overrepresentation of immigrants at both ends
of the skill distribution shown in Figure 1.
4Specifically under aggregation into two skills: low skilled being those with at most high-school, and
high-skilled being the better educated rest.
5Figure 2 displays the College Participation (i.e., percentage of individuals who finished College) for
each cohort according to each respective Census. The series were smoothed with a moving average for
the sake of presentation.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 covers the theoretical model and
results. Section 3 covers the empirical evidence. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
The reader might find our quick reference for notation in Appendix A on page 37 useful,
though we have tried to keep the technical notation (in the main text) at a reasonable
level.
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2 Theoretical findings
2.1 Preliminaries
Our point of departure is a dynamic general equilibrium model where an exogenous skill-
specific technological process determines the efficiency of each of the inputs from an
otherwise fairly typical production function, thus affecting their marginal product.
Our social setup is a continuum of one-adult-one-child families, where the adult is the
choice maker who divides his labor earnings between (family) consumption and schooling
expenditures, the latter being the only (imperfect) way to transfer wealth by affecting the
earnings prospects of the child.
We assume there is a finite number of skills (and hence earnings levels); however our
model still allows for an i.i.d. ability interpretation and assumes a continuous schooling-
expenditures choice as well.
We do impose one key assumption, namely that skills are strictly ordered,6 slightly
complement each other (i.e., there is a finite elasticity of substitution between them), and
that workers are able to perform all jobs that require an equal or lower skill than their
own. In other words, skills are downward substitutable and upward complementary, an
assumption that is consistent with a one-dimensional specialization of labor.7
Another key assumption we make is that labor is the only production factor.8 Since
our interest is on skill composition and not on size of immigrant flows, this is a natural
and greatly simplifying assumption of no further consequence for our results, which are
of qualitative character. As a result of this, however, family income derives exclusively
from workers’ wages and hence wealth heterogeneity within skills is avoided.
It therefore follows that workers, whether immigrant or native, are fully characterized
by their skill level. Moreover, their only choice is how much of their earnings to spend
on consumption (and hence how much to spend on their child’s education) given their
altruistic/filial preferences and their expectations of the future.
Keep in mind that in our competitive general-equilibrium approach, tomorrow’s wages
will be affected by today’s schooling-expenditure decisions of the entire workforce, and
these, in turn, will be affected by expectations of tomorrow’s wages for the entire workforce
as well.
6Let M be the set of skills, then for all a, b ∈ M with a 6= b : a > b or b > a. For our purposes we
use M = {1, 2, ...,m}, with m > 2.
7In real life, specialization is rarely one-dimensional, thus making an ordering of skills according to
this type of “downward substitution” at first sight very unrealistic. A more careful analysis reveals that
this is not as big of a limitation.
8More specifically, workers’ skills are the only production factors.
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So far we have described all but the immigration process. Let us now turn to this.
We assume that immigration policy is a centralized choice made at the beginning of every
period (generation) by some Social Planner (D) that maximizes the sum of all natives’
welfare. The consequences from this policy-choice mechanism are not trivial since, as is
the case in most countries, children of immigrants are born natives9 and thus the objective
function of such a Social Planner will generally change every period. To make this point
as stark as possible, we assume that every generation (time period) has a different Social
Planner, i.e., we assume there is a sequence of Social Planners ({Dt}∞t=0), one for every
period, each of them choosing an immigration policy in order to maximize the added
welfare of their native contemporaries. This is a simple device for capturing the voting
by natives (and not by immigrants).
Thus in a typical time period, the contemporary Social Planner first chooses an im-
migration policy. Second, production takes place with the whole workforce (natives and
immigrants) and receives its payment. And finally, workers spend their earnings on con-
sumption and training/education for their offspring.
Throughout the whole process, decision makers are aware of the structure of the entire
system.
We demonstrate that under suitable conditions the infinite sequential problem (SP)
satisfies a recursive representation, i.e., a functional equation system (FES). Such repre-
sentation allows us to further characterize the equilibrium policies for different techno-
logical processes, thus providing testable implications. We then show in Section 3 data
from the USA and Canada, relate these observed implications with the conditions needed
by the model to produce such patterns, and estimate the parameters in question. It is
through this exercise that we find the consistency from the model/assumptions with the
data.
In this section we first present the model. Next we proceed to define and prove both
the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We then show that the sequential problem
satisfies a functional equation system, a fact that helps us characterize the equilibrium
immigration policy under neutral and skill-biased technological change, thus deriving
testable implications.
2.2 The Model
We will now present the different elements of our model. First we will introduce prefer-
ences; second, we will describe production, followed by schooling; and finally, the tran-
9We take this fact as given although one could imagine that citizenship is granted to preserve peace
and stability, along the same lines of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)’s explanation for the extension of
franchise in the west.
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sition functions (also called Laws of Motion)—one for technology, one for the native
distribution, and one for a typical dynasty’s skill.10 Recall that in a typical time period,
first the contemporaneous Social Planner chooses an immigration policy, then all workers
(native and immigrant) perform their jobs and receive their wages, and finally they divide
their income between consumption and schooling for their child.
2.2.1 Social Structure and Preferences
Workers are the main actors in our model. Each represents and makes choices for a simple
family, consisting of an offspring and an adult (the worker himself).
Let time be t = 0, 1, 2, .... At any period t there is a set of families/workers Lt ⊆ R with
positive measure (some native, some immigrant) indexed by j. Workers are distinguished
by their skill (also called type). There are m strictly ordered skills11 and we denote the
time-invariant set of skills by M = {1, 2, ...,m}.
Notation 2.1 In what follows, depending on the context, we may use up to three subindexes:
j ∈ L for workers/families, i ∈ M for skills/types, and t ∈ {0, 1, ...} for time. We will
always use them in the same order although not always display them all. Thus L is the set
of workers, Li is the set of workers with skill i, and Li,t is the set of workers of type i at
time t. Similarly, c is consumption, ci is consumption of a family whose head is of type i,
ci,t is consumption of a worker (we use family and worker interchangeably) with skill i at
time t and cj,i,t is consumption of worker j (who is of type i) at time t. Finally, whenever
time or skill is not stated (as in L, ci, ct, sj,etc.) the paper refers to the contextual time
period and/or skill; if this context is absent what is meant is “for some period t and/or
for some skill i.”
All workers at any time t have the same preferences over their dynasty’s consumption
stream represented by the following Total Utility function U :
Ujt({cjs}∞s=0) = U ({cjs}∞s=t) = Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
βs−tu(cjs)
]
∀j,∀t (1)
where the consumption stream {cjs}∞s=t is a stochastic process, Et is the expectation
operator given information available at time t, β is the discount factor, and u(·) is the
Instant Utility function.
10A dynasty is the sequence of workers/families with the same index.
11See footnote 6.
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Assumption 1 The time-invariant Instant Utility function u : R++ −→ R is given by
u(x) =
{
b1
1−b2x
1−b2 if b2 6= 1
b1 lnx if b2 = 1
(2)
where b1 > 0 and b2 ≥ 0.12
It follows from Assumption 1 that u(·) is twice continuously-differentiable as well.
2.2.2 Production and Immigration
Recall the set of workers is L ⊆ R, and let us define:
1. the (total) workforce L as the measure of the set L;
2. the set of workers with skill i, Li as the subset of workers in L with skill/ of type i;
and
3. the workforce with skill i, Li, as the measure of the set Li.
The set of workers L is partitioned into the set of native workers N and the set
of immigrant workers I. Analogous definitions like the above 1-3 apply for N and L.
Naturally Li = Ni + Ii and L = N + I =
∑
i∈M
Li =
∑
i∈M
Ni +
∑
i∈M
Ii.
Let us now specify the production function F (·).
Assumption 2 The time-invariant production function F : Rm+ −→ R+ is twice continuously-
differentiable, increasing, (jointly) homogeneous of degree one in its m arguments, has an
elasticity of substitution εp,q ∈ (1,∞) for all p, q ∈M with p 6= q, and its first derivatives
are equalized at some vector x ∈ Rm++.
Assumption 2 remarks that the only inputs for production are the m labor types/skills;
thus, capital is not an input, as we previously indicated. The rest of the assumption is
standard except for the restriction on the elasticity of substitution and the equal marginal
products for some strictly positive vector.
12Where b2 is known in the macroeconomic literature as “the inverse of the instantaneous elasticity
of intertemporal substitution,” while in the microeconomic/financial literature it is known as “the risk
aversion coefficient;” see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2001) for the former, and Mas-Collel et al. (1995) for
the latter.
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Let (a1, a2, ..., am) ∈ Rm++ be the efficiency vector and let the effective labor supply of
type i, Lˆsi , be given by the linear transformation Lˆ
s
i = aiL
s
i . Then, the national product
Y given inputs (Lˆs1, Lˆ
s
2, ..., Lˆ
s
m) would be given by
Y = F (Lˆs1, Lˆ
s
2, ..., Lˆ
s
m) (3)
It is possible to show that an increase in the efficiency units of skill i, i.e., an increase in
ai, will increase i
′s wage, under the same labor supply, only if the elasticity of substitution
between i and the skill h is greater than one for distinct skills i, h. Hence the condition
in Assumption 2 that was left unexplained before.
Notice that equation 3 hides the technological state, is long, and impractical; we will
work with a simpler notation. Since wages are homogeneous of degree zero in labor, the rel-
ative supplies are a sufficient statistic to calculate them. Assume for the moment that Lsi =
Li ∀i, and let λ =

λ1
...
...
λm
 =

L1
...
...
Lm
L−1 and similarly η =

η1
...
...
ηm
 =

N1
...
...
Nm
N−1 and
ι =

ι1
...
...
ιm
 =

I1
...
...
Im
 I−1.
We will call λ ∈ ∆m−1 the labor distribution, η ∈ ∆m−1 the native distribution, and ι
∈ ∆m−1 the immigrant distribution;13 λˆ is constructed following the same logic. Let Rd(m)
denote the set of diagonal matrices of size m×m—that is, let Rd(m) = {G ∈ Rm×m| i 6=
j =⇒ gij = 0}—and define Rd(m)++ analogously. We will write the technological state A as
a diagonal matrix rather than a column vector for notational convenience, so from now
on A ≡ diag(a1, a2, ..., am) ∈ Rd(m)++ , therefore allowing us to write the per-worker output
as:
Y
L
=
F (Lˆ1, Lˆ2, ..., Lˆm)
L
=
F (A(L1, L2, ..., Lm))
L
= F (Aλ) = F (λˆ) (4)
We will use F (Aλ) most of the time for it displays our two key variables, technology and
worker’s skill composition, in a short form.
13where ∆f = {x ∈ [0, 1]f+1|
f+1∑
i=1
xi = 1} is called the f-dimensional unit simplex.
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Consequently wages for workers of type i are given by14
wi =
∂F (Aλ)
∂λi
≡ Fi(Aλ) (5)
In the last paragraphs we assumed workforce Li was equal to supply L
s
i . This is true as
long as some restrictions—in the following paragraphs—are satisfied.
Assume there is an outside/international, time-invariant option d ∈ Rm++ such that
if the domestic wage wi < di natives of type i will emigrate, and if wi > di the supply
of (potential) immigrants of type i will be unlimited.15 Since there are no restrictions
on emigration, but maybe on immigration, for each skill level the wage must be at least
equal to the outside option. Formally,
Definition 1 The labor distributions satisfying outside option restrictions are given by
the set R1(A,d) ≡ {x ∈ Rm+ | ∇xF (Ax) ≥ d} ∩∆m−1
It is possible to show that this set is convex in addition to compact.
Next, the downward-substitutability assumption on skills implies that wages will be
non-decreasing in skill since more skilled workers can always fill lower-skill jobs and will
choose to do so if they are better paid. Formally,
Definition 2 The labor distributions satisfying market-clearing conditions are given by
the set R2(A) ≡ {x ∈ Rm+ |Fi(Ax) ≥ Fi−1(Ax) ∀i > 1} ∩∆m−1
Again, this set is compact, and moreover:
Proposition 1 R2(A) is convex.
Proof : In Appendix B.1
Consequently, the set of feasible labor distributions F(A,d) ≡ R1(A,d) ∩ R2(A)
is a convex and compact set. Furthermore, the supply λs is equal16 to λ as long as
λ ∈ F(A,d).
To guarantee the existence of a λ we make the following:
14Notice Fi(Aλ) 6= ∂F (Aλ)∂(aiλi) ; that is, we take the explicit technological parameter A as part of the
function and not as an argument.
15wi is a sufficient statistic for the worker’s Instant Utility but not for the Total Utility. It can be
shown, however, that this simplification is innocuous for our purposes.
16Technically it is equal to the supply function λs when λ ∈ int(F(A,d)), and it is equal to a selection
of the supply correspondence when λ is in the boundary of F(A,d).
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Assumption 3 F(A0,d) 6= ∅. That is, the set of feasible labor distributions is non-
empty.
The goal of the Social Planner D is to choose the labor distribution λ (by implicitly
allowing the immigrant flows {Ii}mi=1) to maximize his contemporaneous citizens’ well-
being. Formally,
Assumption 4 Every Social Planner Dt has the following Social Welfare function as his
objective function:
m∑
i=1
ηitUit (6)
and his goal is to maximize it by choosing the labor distribution λt.
The following example shows a concrete case:
Example 2.1 If future generations do not matter, i.e., β = 0, then natives’ Total Utility
at time t, would be U({cs}∞s=t) = u(ct). The wage of a native worker of type i given the
worker distribution λ∗t would be wi,t = Fi(Atλ
∗
t ), and since β = 0 we have that optimal
consumption c∗t = wi,t, so u(c
∗
t ) = u(Fi(Atλ
∗
t )). Hence, at the beginning of period t, the
Social Planner Dt chooses immigration policy λ
∗
t to maximize the weighted sum of the
natives’ utilities:
λ∗t = argmax
λ∈F(At,d)
{
m∑
i=1
ηitu(Fi(Atλt))
}
(7)
where ηit is the share of natives with skill i at time t.
Such a myopic economy will tend to benefit each period’s most popular group ηpopular,t =
max
i∈M
{ηit} and thus very likely exhibit oscillating behavior.
E.g., consider M = {1, 2}, At = I ∀t, where I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix; and
let the production function be symmetric, i.e., let F (Lˆ1, Lˆ2) = F (Lˆ2, Lˆ1) ∀Lˆ1, Lˆ2 > 0.
Then starting from η0 = (1/10, 9/10) the resulting equilibrium path will in general satisfy
that η∗1,t > 1/2 whenever t is odd, and η
∗
1,t > 1/2 whenever t is even. The higher the
risk-aversion (i.e., the higher b2 as defined in assumption 1), the more this oscillation will
dampen. For high enough risk-aversion, the economy will converge to an equal distribution
of high and low skill natives, that is, limt→∞ ηt = (1/2, 1/2). On the other hand, with a
zero risk-aversion, the result is a cyclical path very similar to one of the available equilibria
in Ortega’s (2005) model.
Now, consider the previous illustration but change the technological process from “At =
I ∀t” to “At = diag(1, 1.1t) ∀t,” therefore having a skill-biased technological change (i.e.,
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type i = 2 workers experience an increase in their productivity in absolute and relative
terms—relative to i = 1). Again, this economy will generally exhibit oscillations, and for
a high enough risk-aversion it will converge to a degenerate native distribution with all
the natives in the upper skill; that is, limt→∞ ηt = (1, 0). End of example
2.2.3 Schooling
Parents may spend resources to affect their offspring’s likelihood of acquiring skills (skill
acquisition is a random event). For simplicity we assume that children acquire at least
their parent’s skill and at most the next higher skill.17 By convention, and for the sake of
notational simplicity, we let the skill m + 1 equal the skill m. Rational behavior implies
that worker of type m will (trivially) spend no resources on schooling.
If the child acquires only the parent’s skill we call that event an unsuccessful jump.
If he acquires the next higher skill we call that event a successful jump. Since these two
are the only possible outcomes it is natural to consider each jump as a Bernoulli random
variable B, which is independently distributed across families and time (i.e., across (j, t)).
We let B’s probability of success be a function of the training expenditures done by
the parent and the cost of schooling for the sought-after skill.
Thus a child, whose parent j of type i spends resources sj on his education, will
acquire the skill i + B(sj/zi+1), where B(sj/zi+1) is a Bernoulli random variable with
Pr[B(sj/zi+1) = 1] = P (sj/zi+1); the function P (·) will be defined below. The type-
specific variable zi+1 is the training cost for skill i + 1, which we assume proportional to
the parent’s wage: zi+1 = ςi+1wi.
18 The function P (·) is defined as follows:
Assumption 5 P is an increasing, strictly concave, continuously-differentiable function
with P ′(0) =∞, P (∞) = 1, P (0) = 0 and 1 > P ≥ 0.
This will ensure that all parents spend some resources on their child’s schooling when-
ever the next skill enjoys a higher well-being. At the aggregate/economy-wide level, it is
the measure of successful jumps that counts. Therefore we will introduce an aggregate
statistic:
17A generalized version of this mechanism can be done. Suffice to say that as long as the (median)
child does at least as well as his parents, our simplified version will be able to exhibit the same qualitative
properties as the generalized case.
18This assumption is compatible with many interpretations; here are two: first, it could be that a good
amount of the training is done by the parents; second, it could be that this reflects the opportunity cost
(in terms of foregone wages) for the “young adult” by training “any further” than his inherited skill
13
Definition 3 θi is the proportion of attempted jumps, from skill i to skill i+ 1, that are
successful. (If there are no jump attempts θi is considered zero by convention):
θi = θi ({sj}j∈Li) =
{
µ({j∈Li|B(sj/zi+1)=1})
µ({j∈Li| sj>0}) for µ ({j ∈ Li| sj > 0}) > 0
0 otherwise
where µ(S) is the measure of the set S. Since i = 1 is the lowest skill, the cost z1 is
immaterial. Along similar lines, the success rate θm is vacuous since m is the highest skill.
Hence the schooling cost vector is z ∈ Rm−1++ and the success-rate vector is θ ∈ [0, 1]m−1.
2.2.4 Laws of Motion
The technological state A We first define the transition function, or Law of Motion,
for technology A, whose process is exogenous.
Assumption 6 The Law of Motion for Technology follows a (deterministic) Markov pro-
cess given by At+1 = GAt where G ∈ Rd(m)++ .
Definition 4 The technological process {At}∞t=0 is said to be neutral iff gi = g for all i,
for some g > 0.
Definition 5 The technological process is said to be skill-biased iff gi > gi′ > 0 whenever
i > i′.
We focus exclusively on these two families of technological processes.
The native distribution η. Following the structure of our model, there are two parts
determining the Motion for the native distribution. One is the immigration policy which
transforms the native distribution ηt into the worker distribution λt employed in produc-
tion. This transformation is chosen by the contemporaneous Social Planner Dt.
The other part determining the future native distribution is the social/educational
mobility. Recall that the success rate θit ∈ [0, 1) determined the percentage of children,
from parents of type i at time t, that became adults of type i + 1 at period t + 1. Let
θt = (θ1t, θ2t, ..., θm−1t). Then, the next period’s native distribution will be just this
period’s labor distribution λt transformed according to θt; a linear transformation. We
can therefore write the (endogenous) Law of Motion for η as:
ηt+1 = M(θt)λt (8)
14
where M(θt) is a m ×m transition matrix, some of whose entries depend on θt and all
whose rows add up to one.
Notice λt depends on the Social Planner Dt and θt depends on the schooling decisions
{sj}j∈Lt , but we wrote them here as constants for expositional purposes.
Example 2.2 Let m = 3, then at the beginning of period t0 there will be a known state, let
it be (At0 ,ηt0) =
1 0 00 2 0
0 0 2
 ,
2/51/5
2/5
. The contemporaneous Social Planner Dt0 will
choose λt0 to maximize the welfare of these two native groups. Therefore he chooses λ
∗
t0
to maximize the Utility of both groups, weighted by their share of the population. Then, all
workers spend an (individually-optimal) amount of resources in their children’s education,
which translate into a success rate vector θ∗t0. For the sake of exposition, suppose that
λ∗t0 =
3/51/5
1/5
 and θ∗t0 = [θ∗1,t0θ∗2,t0
]
=
[
1/4
2/4
]
, then the transition matrix is
M(θt0) =
1− θ∗1,t0 0 0θ∗1,t0 1− θ∗2,t0 0
0 θ∗2,t0 1
 =
3/4 0 01/4 2/4 0
0 2/4 1

and the native distribution is
ηt0+1 = M(θt0)λ
∗
t0
=
1− θ∗1,t0 0 0θ∗1,t0 1− θ∗2,t0 0
0 θ∗2,t0 1
λ∗1,t0λ∗2,t0
λ∗3,t0
 =
3/4 0 01/4 2/4 0
0 2/4 1
3/51/5
1/5

=
9/205/20
6/20

Notice that there was no need to specify the size of the immigrant flow. The interested
reader can verify that, in this particular example (which entails big changes in the skill
composition), the immigrant flow would have to be at least 40% of the native population.
End of example
Finally we consider the Law of Motion for skill.
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Dynasty j’s skill it Consider dynasty j. Following Subsection 2.2.3 we can write
dynasty j’s Law of Motion for skill as
it+1 = it +B(sjt/zit+1) ∀t
this will turn out to be the only truly random Law of Motion, since the aggregate Laws of
Motion will, in equilibrium, be deterministic (i.e., there will be no aggregate uncertainty).
2.3 Equilibrium
Let Λ¯(A,η) and Θ¯(A,η) be two given continuous functions with Λ¯ : R
d(m)
++ ×∆m−1 −→
∆m−1 and Θ¯ : Rd(m)++ ×∆m−1 −→ [0, 1)m−1. These functions are to be considered as the
continuation policies, i.e., the behavior of λ and θ that will take place in the future or in
today’s economy and cannot be affected unilaterally at the current time period.
We will make use of the following Laws of Motion (9a-c) and equality (9d), all defined
for time h ≥ t :
Ah+1 = GAh h = t, t+ 1, ... (9a)
ηh+1 = M(Θ¯(Ah,ηh))λh h = t, t+ 1, ... (9b)
ih+1 = ih +B(xh/zih+1) h = t, t+ 1, ... (9c)
λh =
{
λt for h = t
Λ¯(Ah,ηh) for h > t
(9d)
For an individual with skill it let Xit,t be the set of all feasible type and state-contingent
plans for schooling expenditures beginning at time t:
Xit,t(λt) = {{xi,h}m,∞i=it,h=t | xi,h ∈ [0, Fi(Ahλh)] subject to eqs. 9a− 9d}
then we define the planner-dependant Value Function for such an individual as:
V˜it(At,ηt,λt| Λ¯, Θ¯) = (10)
max
x∈Xi,t
{
u(Fit(Atλt)− xit,t) + E
[ ∞∑
h=t
βh−tu(Fih(Ahλh)− xih,h)
]}
s.t.(9a− d)
where the expectation operator is over the set of skill sequences {ih}∞h=t conditional on
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x ∈ Xi,t. Denote the first element x∗it,t of the maximizing plan x∗ ∈ Xit,t(λt) for (j, i, t) as
s∗jit(At,ηt,λt|Λ¯, Θ¯), or simply s∗jit, which is j’s optimal schooling expenditure at time t.
Thus the planner-dependant Value Function is the maximum Total Utility a worker
could get if today’s Social Planner enforced immigration policy λ and everyone else be-
haved according to the continuation policies and Laws of Motion (Λ¯, Θ¯ and eqs. 9a-c).
2.3.1 Equilibrium Definition
Definition 6 Let the model satisfy our assumptions. If:
1. Λ(At,ηt) = arg max
λ∈F(At,d)
{
m∑
i=1
ηitV˜i(At,ηt,λ| Λ¯, Θ¯)
}
∀t
2. Θ(At,ηt) = θ({s∗j}j∈Lt) ∀t
and
Λ = Λ¯
Θ = Θ¯
then 〈Λ,Θ〉 is an equilibrium in the Sequential Problem (SP).
In other words, the immigration policy Λ and the success rate function Θ are an
equilibrium if the former is what a rational Social Planner would choose, the latter is the
actual success rate given workers optimal schooling choices, and if these two are equal to
the behavior anticipated by everyone.
2.3.2 Existence and Uniqueness
Let int(S) denote the interior of set S. Then we have:
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness) Let the model satisfy our assumptions, then
there is a value β¯ ≥ 0 such that if 0 ≤ β ≤ β¯, an equilibrium in the Sequential Problem
(SP) exists. Moreover, if the composite functions hi ≡ u ◦ Fi ∀i are strictly concave, then
the equilibrium is unique.
Proof : In appendix B.2
It is worth explaining the relationship between the strict concavity of the functions hi(·)
to the instant utility function u(·) and the production function F (·). One can interpret
this condition loosely as follows: workers prefer the certainty equivalent to a “lottery”
that gives them a high and a low wage. Of course the condition specifies the details of how
high and how low this wages of the lottery are based on the properties of the production
function; and it also specifies the details of exactly how risk averse the workers have to
be to satisfy the condition (some risk aversion is clearly necessary though).
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2.3.3 Recursive Representation
Theorem 2 (Recursive Representation) The equilibrium 〈Λ,Θ〉 satisfies that for all
i, the functions Vi(A,η) ≡ V˜i(A, η,Λ(A,η)| Λ,Θ), Λ and Θ are continuous and are
given by eqs. 11-13:
Vi(A,η) = (11)
max
s∈[0,Fi(AΛ(A,η))]
{
u (Fi(AΛ(A,η))− s)
+βEB [Vi+B(A
′,η′) | B = B(s/zi+1)]
}
s.t. A′ = AG
and η′ = M(Θ(A,η))Λ(A,η)
Λ(A,η) = (12)
arg max
λ∈F(A,d)
{
m∑
i=1
ηi
(
u(Fi(Aλ)− zi+1P−1(Θi(A,η)))
+βEB [Vi+B(A
′,η′) | B = B (P−1(Θi(A,η)))]
)}
s.t. A′ = AG
and η′ = M(Θ(A,η))Λ(A,η)
Θi(A,η) = P (s
∗
i (A,η)) ∀i (13)
where s∗i (A,η) is the maximizer of eq. 11
together called the Functional Equation System (FES).
Proof : In Appendix B.3
2.4 Immigration policies
Assume the uniqueness conditions are satisfied for the rest of the paper.
Given that the equilibrium is unique and satisfies the recursive representation we
are able to characterize the equilibrium immigration policy Λ. It is especially useful
to compare λ, the worker distribution (in equilibrium equal to Λ), with η, the native
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distribution, thus revealing in which direction and at what skill levels the immigrant skill
composition diverges from the native skill composition. A stronger version of this statistic
is the difference between immigrant ι and native distributions η.19 It is easy to show that
the three distributions have the following relationship:
λ = a η + (1− a)ι
where a = N/L. Clearly, if λ differs from η then it does so in exactly the same direction
as ι, but since λ is a convex combination of both distributions, it is generally a weaker
statistic than ι. Hence our use, especially in the empirical Section of the paper, of the
following statistic:
Definition 7 φ ≡ ι−η is the difference between immigrant and native skill distributions.
Phi ( φ ) provides information on which, and by how much, skills are “boosted” or
“suppressed” with respect to the native distribution. Subsection 3.1 shows smoothed
versions of Phi for the USA and Canada for the available Censuses. For example, φm > 0
means ιm > ηm—immigrants have a higher percentage of top skill workers than natives.
Our main results are in the following two Main Theorems.
2.4.1 Neutral Technological Change
Theorem 3 (Main Theorem on Skill-Neutral Technological Change) Let there be
a unique equilibrium under neutral technological change and with positive discount factor,
that is, with G ≡ g I
m×m
for some g > 0, and with β > 0. Then, there exists a stationary
native distribution, call it η∗SS, which has an associated stationary worker distribution
λ∗SS, and an associated stationary success rate vector θ
∗
SS. Moreover:
1) η∗SS first order dominates λ
∗
SS, i.e., φi,SS is decreasing in i.
2) Vi(A,η
∗
SS) > Vi′(A,η
∗
SS) ∀i, i′ ∈M with i > i′, and ∀A ∈ {At}∞t=0
3) θ∗SS > 0 ≡ (0, 0, . . . , 0).
4) Fi(Aλ
∗
SS) > Fi′(Aλ
∗
SS) ∀i, i′ ∈M with i > i′, and ∀A ∈ {At}∞t=0.
Proof : In Appendix B.4
Theorem 3 says that under neutral technological change, the steady-state native skill
distribution will always first-order stochastically dominate the steady-state worker skill
distribution and, hence, the steady-state immigrant skill distribution. Thus there will
be low-skill immigrants as long as immigration is positive. Moreover, regardless of the
19ι was defined together with η and λ on page 10.
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metric/scale used for skills, the average skill of immigrants will always be lower than that
of natives.
The intuition for this result is as follows: Under isolation (without any possibility of
immigration), the economy would tend to perfect equality, i.e., every skill would earn the
same wage in the limit (this being the steady state). However the possibility of immigra-
tion, and the fact that schooling is decentralized, always encourages some immigration
and schooling.
Clearly the high-skill natives are better off, earning an above-the-egalitarian wage and
benefiting from their scarcity vis-a-vis the abundance of low skilled workers. As for the
rest of the natives, they will become high-skilled in finite time, with probability one,
therefore enjoying an above-the-egalitarian wage (being the scarce factor) thereafter.
2.4.2 Skill-biased Technological Change
Theorem 4 (Main Theorem on Skill-Biased Technological Change) Let there be
a unique equilibrium under skill-biased technological change with m ≥ 3, allowing all—
except the bottom—skill outside options di with i > 1 to increase at a positive (though
small), order preserving, rate, i.e., let gm > . . . g2 > gdm > . . . > gd2 > 1 ≥ gd1 S g1. Let
{η∗t ,λ∗t ,θ∗t}∞t=0 be the equilibrium-path values for η,λ and θ, then:
1) There exists no stationary native distribution ηSS.
2) θ∗t > 0 ∀t
3) Vi(At,η
∗
t ) > Vi′(At,η
∗
t ) ∀i, i′ ∈M with i > i′, and ∀t ∈N
4) φ∗1,t > 0 for all t > nSB1 for some nSB1 ∈N.
Moreover if the relative risk aversion is strong enough, and the discount factor is small
enough, then:
5) φ∗m,t > 0 for all t > nSB2 for some nSB2 ∈N
Proof : In Appendix B.5
Corollary (3 Skills)
If the conditions of Theorem 4 are satisfied and m = 3, then φi,t is u-shaped in i for all
t > nC for some nC ∈N.
The previous corollary says that in an economy with exactly three skills, skill-biased
technological change and strongly risk-averse citizens, the immigration policy will favor
the overrepresentation of immigrants at both ends of the skill spectrum, leading to a
3-segment pattern as the one in figure 1 on page 3.
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3 Empirical Findings
3.1 Stylized facts
Let us proceed directly to analyze the skill distributions for the USA and Canada through
the following figures. These figures are smoothed versions of Phi (the difference between
native and immigrant distributions, definition 7 on page 19) for each available Census. A
detailed description of their construction follows:
1. We take all the individuals who are 25 through 45 years old from each Census.
2. We classify those who were born outside of the country in question as immigrants,
the rest as natives.
3. We get the distribution of educational level for both of these groups and construct
the difference between these two (immigrant minus native). This difference is Phi.
4. We smooth Phi using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothness parameter equal to
two.
This is done for each and every available Census for each country. We have included
the source tables, i.e., the distributions of immigrant and native educational attainment
in Appendix C.20 It is a shame that the USA Censuses did not consider the whole skill
spectrum until 1990 (capping it at the college level), since this has obviously distorted our
USA figures for the previous time periods (very likely hiding the real pattern, accurately
displayed for the years 1990 and 2000). For the sake of completeness, these have been
included nevertheless. The resulting figures follow.
20Some of the category names were too long to be displayed in the figures. Please see the source tables
for the complete category names.
21
3.1.1 USA
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Figure 3: Phi, USA 1940
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Figure 4: Phi, USA 1950
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USA's Phi 1960 H-P
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Figure 5: Phi, USA 1960
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Figure 6: Phi, USA 1970
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USA's Phi 1980 H-P
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Figure 7: Phi, USA 1980
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USA's Phi 1990 H-P
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Figure 8: Phi, USA 1990
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USA's Phi 2000 H-P
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Figure 9: Phi, USA 2000
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3.1.2 Canada
Canada's Phi 1971 H-P
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Figure 10: Phi, Canada 1971
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Canada's Phi 1981 H-P
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Figure 11: Phi, Canada 1981
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Canada's Phi 1991 H-P
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
B
el
ow
 g
ra
de
 5
G
ra
de
s 
5-
8
G
ra
de
s 
9-
13
H
ig
h 
sc
ho
ol
 g
ra
du
at
io
Tr
ad
es
 c
er
tif
ic
at
e 
or
N
on
-u
ni
ve
rs
ity
 w
ith
ou
N
on
-u
ni
ve
rs
ity
 w
ith
 t
N
on
-u
ni
ve
rs
ity
 w
ith
 c
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
, n
o 
ce
rti
f
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
r c
ol
le
ge
B
ac
he
lo
r o
r f
irs
t p
ro
C
er
tif
ic
at
e 
or
 d
ip
lo
m
M
as
te
r's
 d
eg
re
e
D
oc
to
ra
l d
eg
re
e
Educational Level
P
e
r c
e
n
t a
g
e
 P
o
i n
t s
Figure 12: Phi, Canada 1991
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Canada's Phi 2001 H-P
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Figure 13: Phi, Canada 2001
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3.2 Estimation of the technological process
Observation of the empirical Phi in the previous section suggests that the theory will be
consistent with the data only if both Canada and the USA behave as if they experienced
skill-biased technological change and had a finite elasticity of substitution greater than
one between their different types of labor.
In order to test these two conditions, we proceed to estimate the production function
and its technological process. We assume that both the USA and Canada have the same
technological process and production function, and estimate them using USA data.
Since the data is generally scarce we need to make some parametric assumptions on
F . We therefore use the familiar CES functions.
Another parametric choice that we have to make is the number of skills/schooling
levels considered. The trade-offs are, among others, the degrees of freedom versus the
accuracy of the technological-process estimation. The minimum number of skills needed
to check for consistency of the theory is m = 3. Since our available data is a short panel we
impose these 3 skills, aggregating as suggested by the 3-segment partition of the schooling
spectrum in figure 1.
Our universe for this estimation contains all the individuals who received positive
wages for the last year before the Census, and whose age is at least 30 years. We use data
from IPUMS USA,21 which allows us to exploit the disaggregated micro data on schooling
attendance for the Censuses 1940 through 2000.
We assume the following specification
F (λˆts) =
[
3∑
i=1
(
λˆits
)ρ]1/ρ
λˆits = ai,tλits
ai,t = ai,0 (gi)
t
where s stands for political state of the USA (i.e., the cross-sectional unit).
Table 1 displays the estimated terms from two different approaches (with different
sets of assumptions).22 According to Table 2, which displays the implied parameters of
interest, both of the elasticity estimates lie within a range of (1, 8), a range that other
estimations, like the ones in the survey by Hamermesh (1993), would suggest as standard.
We conclude that the first condition for consistency with our model is satisfied (finite
elasticity greater than one).
21Ruggles, S. et al. (2004).
22For the sake of space—and since this part is not the main contribution of the paper—the details of
the estimation process have been omitted. They are available upon request.
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Table 1: Estimates from Specification
Term Method I Method II
ρ ln(a1,1940) 3.772 318**** NA
(0.087 496)
ρ ln(a2,1940) 3.825 921**** NA
(0.120 037)
ρ ln(a3,1950) 3.783 906**** NA
(0.165 038)
ln(g1) -0.030 374** -0.076 783****
(0.014 973) (0.007 954)
ln(g2) 0.067 080**** 0.023 069****
(0.003 282) (0.002 723)
ln(g3) 0.136 272**** 0.027 345****
(0.006 301) (0.006 412)
ρ− 1 -0.147 203**** -0.941 169****
(0.021 552) (0.009 017)
We employ the following markers for the respective levels of
confidence: (*)90%, (**)95%, (***)99%, and (****)99.9%.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2: Implied Point Estimates of Interest
Parameter Method I Method II
a1,1940 83.384 874 NA
a2,1940 88.794 301 NA
a3,1950 84.525 660 NA
g1 0.970 082 0.926 090
g2 1.069 381 1.023 337
g3 1.145 994 1.027 723
ε 6.793 356 1.062 507
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Table 2 displays as well the estimated technological processes. In both cases skill-
biased with the point estimates for the bottom-, medium- and top-efficiency growth rates
in the ranges [-8%,-2%],[2%,7%] and [3%,14%] respectively. We conclude that the second
condition for consistency with our model is satisfied as well, namely, these economies
behave as if they experienced a skilled bias technological change.
In other words, our model is consistent with the data: if the elasticity (of substitution)
is greater than one, and the economy behaves as if it experienced skill-biased technological
change, then we should observe the patterns from figures 8 through 13.
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4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown evidence of unconventional immigration patterns in two of the
traditional countries of destination (USA and Canada) for recent decades. These uncon-
ventional immigration patterns consist of overrepresentation of immigrants at both ends
of the skill distribution (and hence an underrepresentation of immigrants at the middle
of the skill distribution).
The paper also proposed a theoretical framework, capable of generating such patterns
under plausible assumptions such as strong risk aversion, credit restrictions, and filial
altruism, among others.
In general, the theory predicts that under any skill-biased technological change, the
high skilled and low skilled individuals of less developed countries will be attracted by
rapidly growing democracies. This in turn would make the skill composition of the source
countries more homogeneous and reduce the low-middle skill wage-differential until it is
equalized between all, the countries of origin and the countries of destination.
Analysis of other traditional destination countries, such as Australia, as well as of
other fast-growing democracies, like New Zealand, remains to be done. When doing
such analyses the most-possible-disaggregated data is to be employed, since otherwise the
pattern that has been pointed out could be eliminated through aggregation in the same
manner it probably was eliminated at the top of the 80s skill distribution for the USA,
due to the coarse classification of that Census.
Some of the possible directions for further research include analyzing the effects of
given income-tax funded provision of public goods and/or simply the effects of given
redistributive schemes. Intuition suggests that such schemes would likely result in less
desirability of (higher opposition to) unskilled immigrants.
Finally, the search for another explanation of the exposed phenomenon is open; special-
interest politics being a natural candidate. In the author’s opinion this explanation is
complementary and hence “non-rival.” He also strongly believes that any other explana-
tion would need to acknowledge the fact that immigration policies are binding (i.e., entry
into fast-growing democracies is—at least partially—controlled) in order to be seriously
considered.
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A Appendix: Quick Reference for Notation
A.1 Set Theoretical Notation
S = {x, y, z} means S is a set whose elements are x, y, z
S = {x : p(x)} means S is the set of x’s for which statement p (which depends on x) is
true; often “|” is used instead of “:”
x ∈ S means x is an element of the set S
Q ⊆ S means Q is a subset of S, i.e., Q is a set whose elements are all contained in S as
well
Q ⊂ S means Q is a proper subset of S, i.e., Q is a set whose elements are all contained
in S but who is not equal to S. Hence Q has some but not all the elements contained
in S.
N is the set of natural numbers: N = {1, 2, 3, ...}
N0 is the set of non-negative integers: N0 = {0, 1, 2, ...}
R is the set of real numbers: R = {x : +∞ > x > −∞}
R+ is the set of non-negative real numbers: R = {x : +∞ > x ≥ 0}
R++ is the set of positive real numbers: R = {x : +∞ > x > 0}
Rb is the set of b-dimensional real vectors, where b ∈N, thus: Rb = {x = (x1, x2, ...xb) :
xk ∈ R for all k = 1, 2, ...b}
Rb×c is the set of real valued matrices of dimension b × c, where both b, c ∈ N thus:
Rb×c = {[bij]b,ci=1,j=1 : xk ∈ R for all k = 1, 2, ...b}
A.2 Notation of the paper
j is the index for families / workers / dynasties, we use j ∈ L ⊆ R
i is the index for skill / type, we use i ∈M
t is the index for time, we use t ∈N0
m is the total number of skills and the index of the top skill
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M is the set of skills, we assume M = {1, 2, ...,m} ⊂N
T is the last period in a finite-horizon Setup, that is T ∈N0
u(c) is the Instant Utility function, where c ∈ R+ is consumption
Uit is the Total Utility of some i at time t
F (x) is the time-invariant production function, where x ∈ Rm+
L is the set of workers, we let L ⊆ R
L is the measure of the set L, formally L = µ(L), where µ(S) is called the Lebesgue
measure of set S.
Li is the set of workers with skill i, i.e., Li = {j | j is of skill i}
Li = µ(Li)
Lt is the set of workers at time t
Lt = µ(Lt)
Lit is the set of workers with skill i at time t
Lit = µ(Lit)
N is the set of natives, and if immigration is non-negative then N ⊆ L
N = µ(N )
I is the set of immigrants
I = µ(I)
λ = (L1, L2, ..., Lm)L
−1 is called the labor distribution
η = (N1, N2, ..., Nm)N
−1 is called the native distribution
ι = (I1, I2, ..., Im)I
−1 is called the immigrant distribution
s is the schooling expenditure variable
zi is the cost of schooling for skill i
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P (·) is the ”P-function” a function that gives the probability of acquiring the next higher
skill given expenditures over the cost of the sought-after skill.
B(·) is the Bernoulli random variable taking value of one for a successful jump to the
next skill and zero if not a successful jump, i.e., the child remains with his parent’s
skill
θ is the success rate vector, of dimension (m− 1)× 1
Θ(·, ·) is the vector-valued (aggregate-)schooling policy function
Λ(·, ·) is the vector-valued immigration policy
V˜it is the planner-dependant Value Function, i.e., the Value Function of an individual i
at time t as a function of State and policy choice of the Social Planner at time t
Vit is the equilibrium Value Function
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B Appendix: Proofs of Section 2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We want to show that
R2(A) ≡ {x ∈ Rm+ |Fi(Ax) ≥ Fi−1(Ax) ∀i > 1} ∩∆m−1
is a convex set.
Definition 8 The Set of Wage Equality Distributions is
E(A) = {λ ∈ ∆m−1|Fi(Aλ) = Fi′(Aλ)∀i, i′ ∈M}
which is a non-empty set by Assumption 3.
Definition 9 the Best Wage Equality Distribution is λ=A = arg max
λ∈E(A)
F (Aλ)
We just write λ= from now on, keeping A fixed. Next we define the following implicit
function δ(λ) : ∆m−1 −→ Rm+ using the following equation system (m − 1 independent
equations since λ is in a m− 1 dimensional space):
λ= = diag(δ1, δ2, ..., δm)λ
Lemma 1 [δi(λ) is non-increasing in i and λ ∈ ∆m−1] ⇐⇒ [λ ∈ R2(A)]
Proof of Lemma 1. We proof in direction to the left by contradiction, suppose we
have some λ˜ ∈ R2(A)\{λ=A} with δi(λ˜) > δi−1(λ˜) for some i, i − 1 ∈ M. It has to be
that
m∑
j=i
λ˜j <
m∑
j=i
λ=j (14)
or else we already have a contradiction since the distribution λ= has the most possible
mass at the top subject to adding up to one, i.e., any λ 6= λ= in R2(A) will have the top
component with less mass/frequency: λm < λ
=
m. Now, going back to inequality 14 define
S˜ ≡
m∑
j=i
λ˜j and S
= =
m∑
j=i
λ=j and multiply λ˜ by S
=/S˜ to get
λ˜
′ ≡ λ˜(S=/S˜)
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which, since wages are homogeneous, is equivalent for checking wage restrictions although
it does not necessarily belong to ∆m−1. Notice now that
m∑
j=i
λ˜j =
m∑
j=i
λ=j but λ˜
′
i−1 > λ
=
i−1
thus having that
m∑
j=i−1
λ˜′j >
m∑
j=i−1
λ=j
a contradiction to λ˜
′
satisfying Fi(Aλ˜
′
) > Fi−1(Aλ˜
′
) ∀i, and therefore to λ˜ ∈ R2(A).
The other direction of the proof uses the same argument(s). Q.E.D.
It is now straightforward to prove that R2(A) is convex:
Proof of Proposition 1 (continuation)
Take two elements of R2(A), say λ1 and λ2. Then both δi(λ1) and δi(λ2) are non-
increasing in i, as is their convex combination, so the convex combination of these two
elements is in the same set again, by Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Following Stokey et al. (1989) we can designate this as a sequential problem (SP). If
every finite sequential problem (i.e., T < ∞) has an (a unique) equilibrium, and the
planner-dependant Value Functions V˜i have an upper bound then it follows by continuity
that an (a unique) equilibrium exists for T −→∞.
Lemma 2 Every finite SP has an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2. Start with backward induction at time T . ΛT (AT ,ηT ) exists
because of compactness of the feasible set F() (and is unique if the hi’s are strictly concave
because the objective function of the Social Planner, which is a linear combination of them,
will be strictly concave). So at T − 1, for any λ = ΛT (AT ,ηT ) ∈ F(AT ,d), workers of
type i0 < m will all choose the same amount of schooling for two reasons:
1) P (·) is strictly concave
2) Workers have rational expectations, i.e., they know ΛT , and thus are identical
within skills.
Thus since sji = si ∀j ∈ Li,T−1, ∀i ∈ M we have that 1LT−1
∫
Li,T−1 B(αji/ςi+1)dj =
λiP (αi/ςi+1) by the Law of Large Numbers, and so θi = P (αi/ςi+1) in equilibrium ∀i ∈
M\{m}. So there is no aggregate uncertainty. Again, just before immigration occurs at
T − 1, all natives know the deterministic consequences of every (feasible) policy λ, a fact
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that the Social Planner DT−1 takes into account for choosing Λ from, again a compact set,
F(AT−1,d). One has to be careful at this point for showing uniqueness of Λ since DT−1’s
objective function does not directly inherit the strict concavity this time. However, it is
strictly concave in this case as well (i.e., Λ is unique), this is shown in Lemma 3 below.
The process repeats itself over and over without any aggregate uncertainty ad infinitum
(with uniqueness preserved in the corresponding case). Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 Λt is unique for t < T (given strict concavity of the hi functions).
Proof of Lemma 3. Note that if we show ΛT−1 is unique for all AT−1,ηT−1 then the
Lemma follows directly.
Since ΛT−1(AT−1,ηT−1) = arg max
λT−1∈F(AT−1,d)
{
m∑
i=1
ηi,T−1V˜i,T−1(AT−1,ηT−1,λT−1)
}
, show-
ing that the planner-dependant Value Functions V˜iT−1 of the individuals are strictly con-
cave in λT−1 for any (AT−1,ηT−1) is sufficient. Consider these planner-dependant Value
Functions from the Social Planner DT−1’s perspective:
V˜i,T−1(AT−1,ηT−1,λT−1) = u(Fi(AT−1λT−1)−Θi,T−1(AT−1,ηT−1))
+ β [PiVi+1,T (AT ,ηT (λT−1)) + (1− Pi)Vi,T (AT ,ηT (λT−1))]
where Vi,T (AT ,ηT (λT−1)) = V˜i,T (AT ,ηT (λT−1),ΛT (AT ,ηT (λT−1)))
and ηT (λT−1) = M(ΘT−1(AT−1,ηT−1))λT−1
and Pi ≡ P (Θi,T−1(AT−1,ηT−1))
where P (·) is the P -function defined in assumption 5. Notice DT−1 takes AT−1,ηT−1
and ΘT−1 as given, 23 and u(·) remains strictly concave in λT−1. So all we need to
show is the concavity of Vi,T (AT ,ηT (λT−1)) in λT−1. Notice that Vi,T (AT ,ηT (λT−1)) =
V˜i,T (AT ,ηT (λT−1),ΛT (AT ,ηT (λT−1))) = V˜i,T (AT ,ΛT (AT ,ηT (λT−1))), where on the
RHS of the equality the second argument, ηT , was dropped because at T , ηT has no
effect on future utility (it is the last period, so the second argument of the function is
meaningless).
That is, Lemma 3 follows from the concavity of V˜i,T (AT ,ΛT (AT ,ηT (λT−1))) with
respect to λT−1 proven in Claims 1 and 2, since the sum of a strictly concave and a
concave function is strictly concave as well. This makes the maximizer unique (recall that
the feasible set is convex and compact). Q.E.D.
Claim 1 ΛT (AT ,ηT (λT−1)) is concave in λT−1
23The former two because they are predetermined, the latter because he takes the citizens’ schooling
behavior as given (and state-dependent).
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Proof of Claim 1. To see this consider:
ΛT (AT ,ηT (λT−1)) = arg max
x∈F(AT ,d)
{
m∑
i=1
ηiT (λT−1)V˜iT (AT ,x)
}
Stacking the functions
(
V˜iT (AT ,x)
)m
i=1
into the vector-valued function V˜iT (AT ,x) we
can write
ΛT (AT ,ηT (λT−1)) = arg max
x∈F(AT ,d)
{
m∑
i=1
ηiT (λT−1)V˜iT (AT ,x)
}
= arg max
x∈F(AT ,d)
{
ηT (λT−1)
T V˜iT (AT ,x)
}
= arg max
x∈F(AT ,d)
{(
M¯λT−1
)T
V˜iT (AT ,x)
}
where vT is the transpose of vector v, and the last step follows from the fact that
ΘT−1(AT−1,ηT−1) is taken as a constant positive-definite transition matrix by DT−1.
And therefore
ΘT−1(AT−1,ηT−1)λT−1 = M¯λT−1 = ηT (λT−1)
for some M¯ ∈ Rm×m+ .
We now show that ΛT (AT ,ηT (λT−1)) is linear in λT−1. Let α be a positive constant,
then:
αΛT (AT ,ηT (λT−1)) = α arg max
x∈F(AT ,d)
{(
M¯λT−1
)T
V˜iT (AT ,x)
}
= arg max
x∈F(AT ,d)
{
α
(
M¯λT−1
)T
V˜iT (AT ,x)
}
= arg max
x∈F(AT ,d)
{(
M¯αλT−1
)T
V˜iT (AT ,x)
}
= ΛT (AT ,ηT (αλT−1))
so the function is linear. Therefore the function is concave, which proves the Claim.
Q.E.D.
Claim 2 V˜i,T (AT ,ΛT (AT ,ηT (λT−1))) is concave in λT−1
Proof of Claim 2. Follows directly from the fact that both, V˜i,T (AT ,x) is concave
in x, and ΛT (AT ,ηT (x)) is concave in x. Therefore their composition is concave in x as
well. (The composition of two concave functions is concave). Q.E.D.
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B.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Following Stokey et al. (1989) we know that as long as [0, Fi(AΛ(A,η))] 6= ∅ for all A,η
(which is the case with F(A,d) non-empty) and a limit for all feasible sequences exists
(shown previously by the boundedness using β¯), the sequential problem is well defined
and Vi satisfies the usual Functional Equation employed in Dynamic Programming (The-
orem 4.2 in Stokey et al.). Since this is an equilibrium, it must be that, by construction,
Λ and Θ satisfy the functional equations as well. Λ is continuous by the convexity and
compactness of the opportunity set F(A,d) and Θ is continuous by the continuity of the
maximizer s∗i (A,η) for all i. Q.E.D.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 3
We proceed in three steps. First we show that by a Fixed-Point argument it is possible to
show the existence of such a steady state. Then we show that the two assumed conditions
in step one are satisfied.
B.4.1 Existence of a steady state
In a steady state we have that the law of motion satisfies:
ηSS = M(θSS)λSS
Since this is an equilibrium, we also have that
λSS = Λ(At,ηSS) ∀t
θSS = Θ(At,ηSS) ∀t
Thus it must be that both policy functions Λ,Θ are time-invariant. Assume this is true
for now (it will be proven in the other two steps). Then it follows that
ηSS = M(Θ(ηSS))Λ(ηSS)
Since η ∈ ∆m−1 (a convex and compact set), and all functions are continuous, it follows
by Brouwer’s Theorem that such a vector (ηSS) exists.
B.4.2 The constancy of Θ(At,ηSS)
Since in equilibrium Θi(At,ηSS) = P (s
∗
i /zi+1) = P (α
∗
i (At,ηSS)/ςi) it is enough to show
the constancy of α∗i .
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It can be shown with some algebra that in a such a steady state, the Value functions
can be represented as follows:
Vi(At,ηSS) =
m∑
h=i
Γhu(wh,t) (15)
Where the Γh’s are some time-invariant coefficients and wh,t is the wage of type h at time
t.
Hence the First Order Condition for i’s choice of α can be rewritten like:
Γ′0 =
m∑
h=i
Γ′h
u(wh,t)
u′(wi,t)wi,t
Where the Γ’s again are some time-invariant coefficients.
It can be shown that, given Assumption 1, the RHS of this equation is actually time-
invariant, thus proving the constancy of α (for all i’s) and hence for Θ.
B.4.3 The constancy of Λ(At,ηSS)
Recall that the social planner chooses λ to maximize his Objective Function:∑
i∈M
ηi,SSVi(At,ηSS)
From equation 15 we know that this Objective function can be represented as follows:
∑
i∈M
m∑
h=i
Γhu(wh,t)
Moreover by Assumption 1 and the fact that in such a steady state the wage of type h
can be represented as wh,t = wh,0g
t we can further simplify the Objective function to get:
u(gt)
∑
Γ′′
Where the Γ′′s are again time-invariant. Thus showing that the optimal λ is independent
of t. Q.E.D
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B.5 Proof of Theorem 4
B.5.1 Nonexistence of a steady state
Let us proof the nonexistence of a steady state by contradiction,
Suppose there was a steady state ηSS, then even if λ wasn’t stationary, we would have
ηSS = M(θ
∗
t )λ
∗
t thus necessarily having that ηSS first order dominates λ
∗
t for all t. In
other words, λm would be bounded and so would
m∑
i=j
λi for all j > 1, thus having that
wages for the high skill would eventually start increasing without bounds, implying an
increasing inequality under the same native electorate ηSS, which directly contradicts the
Immigration Policy characterized in Theorem 3.
B.5.2 Inequality
Consider now inequality. It is enough if we show that Vm > Vm−1 since then the rest of
the inequalities follow.
Let us again proceed by contradiction supposing that Vm = Vm−1, then it would have
to be the case that P (s∗m−1) = θm−1 = 0 and that the excess demand of the top skill (the
minimal amount of top skilled workers needed to keep wages of types m and m−1 equal)
is satisfied with top-skilled immigration.
But then we have that an infinitesimal increase in immigration-induced inequality
would make everyone weakly better off (and some strictly), a Pareto improvement that is
always done by the equilibrium Immigration Policy Λ. Again, this is due to the infinite
returns of the P function at the origin.
B.5.3 ιm,t becomes positive in finite time
Let us now show that schooling at the next-to-top skill goes to zero as time increases.
Since, for a suitably small discount factor, λm,t increases with time, it must be that ιm > 0
eventually.
If a unique equilibrium exists, it must be that the Value functions Vi are well-defined
(they exist and are finite). Therefore we can construct a new Value function, say
Vˆm,t =
u(wˆi,0)
1− βu(wˆm,0)u(gˆm)
t
for some wˆm,0, gˆm ∈ R++ such that Vˆm,t ≥ Vm,t. Along the same lines, we know w1,t ≥ d1,t
so we can construct a Value function like
Vˆ1,t =
u(d1,0)
1− βu(gd)u(gd)
t
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which satisfies Vˆ1,t ≤ V1,t (recall gd > 1). Therefore we have that
∆Vm,t ≤ ∆Vˆm,t
Consider now the First Order Condition of i = m − 1 (and bear in mind that si,t =
αi,twi,t and zi+1,t = ςiwi,t):
wi,tu
′([1− αi,t]wi,t) = β
ςi
P ′
(
αi,t
ςi
)
∆Vi+1,t+1
Therefore, using our bounding Value functions we know that our bounding αˆ will be at
least as big as the original α:
wi,tu
′([1− αˆi,t]wi,t) = β
ςi
P ′
(
αˆi,t
ςi
)
∆Vˆi+1,t+1
It can then be shown that αˆ will go to zero when t goes to infinity as long as the following
is true:
gˆd >
u(gˆm)
u′(gd)
That is, as long as (
gd
gˆm
)1−b2
>
1
1− b2
Where b2 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion from our Instant Utility function (see
assumption 1). This inequality is trivially satisfied for b2 > 1. Q.E.D.
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C Appendix: Source Tables for Figures in Section 3.1
C.1 USA
Table 3: USA 1940
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
None or preschool 1.29 6.58 5.29 6.823252
Grade 1, 2, 3, or 4 6.7 12.76 6.06 5.742843
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 40.86 49.96 9.1 3.895809
Grade 9 6.97 4.31 -2.66 0.674101
Grade 10 8.22 5.31 -2.91 -1.928232
Grade 11 4.53 2.25 -2.28 -3.584191
Grade 12 18.59 11.71 -6.88 -4.457664
1 to 3 years of college 7.04 3.33 -3.71 -4.06044
4+ years of college 5.8 3.78 -2.02 -3.115477
Table 4: USA 1950
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
None or preschool 0.93 3.13 2.20 3.391199
Grade 1, 2, 3, or 4 4.88 8.03 3.14 3.285291
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 28.21 35.08 6.87 2.583785
Grade 9 6.82 5.31 -1.51 0.618434
Grade 10 8.43 6.56 -1.88 -1.135899
Grade 11 6.17 4.37 -1.80 -2.268568
Grade 12 28.05 23.62 -4.42 -2.740978
1 to 3 years of college 9.08 7.20 -1.88 -2.280249
4+ years of college 7.43 6.71 -0.72 -1.453014
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Table 5: USA 1960
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
None or preschool 0.66 3.19 2.53 4.201203
Grade 1, 2, 3, or 4 2.81 7.25 4.44 4.060947
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 19.57 27.35 7.78 3.085089
Grade 9 6.89 4.89 -2 0.627556
Grade 10 8.59 6.67 -1.92 -1.610272
Grade 11 6.69 5.87 -0.82 -3.240793
Grade 12 34.62 24.1 -10.52 -4.031267
1 to 3 years of college 10.43 10.53 0.1 -2.53856
4+ years of college 9.75 10.15 0.4 -0.563902
Table 6: USA 1970
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
None or preschool 0.73 2.57 1.84 4.141774
Grade 1, 2, 3, or 4 1.32 5.75 4.43 4.988774
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 10.81 22.77 11.96 4.684887
Grade 9 5.65 4.93 -0.72 1.799839
Grade 10 7.77 5.91 -1.86 -1.459086
Grade 11 6.55 4.75 -1.8 -4.144525
Grade 12 40.25 26.23 -14.02 -5.509572
1 to 3 years of college 12.65 11.88 -0.77 -3.635059
4+ years of college 14.26 15.21 0.95 -0.857031
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Table 7: USA 1980
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
None or preschool 0.41 2.32 1.91 4.209877
Grade 1, 2, 3, or 4 0.5 5.39 4.89 5.32388
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 4.73 16.4 11.67 5.287945
Grade 9 3.3 3.99 0.69 2.735194
Grade 10 4.44 3.88 -0.56 -0.510225
Grade 11 4.25 3.75 -0.5 -3.64676
Grade 12 40.2 25.81 -14.39 -5.897747
1 to 3 years of college 20.59 16.79 -3.8 -4.913141
4+ years of college 21.59 21.68 0.09 -2.589023
Table 8: USA 1990
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
No school completed 0.44 4.25 3.81 4.867264
1st-4th grade 0.16 4.21 4.05 5.301604
5th-8th grade 1.79 11.83 10.04 5.207312
9th grade 1.82 3.66 1.84 3.429954
10th grade 2.97 2.86 -0.11 1.231439
11th grade 3.03 2.46 -0.57 -0.921298
12th grade, no diploma 2.82 5.13 2.31 -3.232046
High school graduate, or GED 32.03 19.17 -12.86 -5.728941
Some college, no degree 22.66 15.32 -7.34 -5.669099
Associate degree 8.43 7.09 -1.34 -3.875164
Bachelors degree 16.46 14.72 -1.74 -2.005229
Masters degree 5.08 5.78 0.7 -0.449808
Professional degree 1.75 2.16 0.41 0.533203
Doctorate degree 0.54 1.29 0.75 1.260809
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Table 9: USA 2000
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
No school completed 0.46 4.27 3.81 4.305049
1st-4th grade 0.1 2.28 2.18 5.089005
5th-8th grade 1.27 12.63 11.36 5.625435
9th grade 1.5 4.8 3.3 4.212314
10th grade 2.44 2.72 0.28 2.014896
11th grade 2.76 2.54 -0.22 -0.257719
12th grade, no diploma 3.23 5.96 2.73 -2.763882
High school graduate, or GED 30.35 19.27 -11.08 -5.643083
Some college, no degree 24.16 14.86 -9.3 -6.287871
Associate degree 8.34 5.79 -2.55 -4.809254
Bachelors degree 18.16 15.02 -3.14 -2.824306
Masters degree 5.01 6.05 1.04 -0.82047
Professional degree 1.7 2.37 0.67 0.556959
Doctorate degree 0.52 1.43 0.91 1.592926
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C.2 Canada
Table 10: Canada 1971
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
No schooling 0.7 1.37 0.67 1.391992
Below grade 5 2.07 4.35 2.28 -0.512506
Grades 5-8 26.44 25.48 -0.96 -2.778
Grades 9-10 (1971) 26.41 15.99 -10.42 -4.369234
Grade 11 (1971) 13.03 8.1 -4.93 -3.34195
Grade 12 (1971) 15.87 15.94 0.07 -0.777274
Grade 13 (1971) 3.07 9.74 6.67 1.449642
University, years 1-2, no degree 4.36 5.14 0.78 1.887284
University, years 3-4, no degree 1.36 2.71 1.35 1.694317
University, years 5+, no degree 0.22 0.76 0.54 1.475764
University, years 3-4, degree 3.2 4.19 0.99 1.664489
University, years 5+, degree 3.26 6.23 2.97 2.225477
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Table 11: Canada 1981
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
Below grade 5 1.23 3.67 2.44 1.614216
Grades 5-8 10.07 11.03 0.96 -0.873963
Grades 9-13 22.64 16.3 -6.34 -2.94925
High school graduation
certificate
15.35 10.06 -5.29 -3.281772
Trades certificate or
diploma
3.69 3.83 0.14 -2.237029
Non-university without
trades or college certificate
or diploma
6.26 5.13 -1.13 -1.184638
Non-university with trades
certificate or diploma
8.77 9.83 1.06 -0.3057
Non-university with col-
lege certificate or diploma
10.15 9.89 -0.26 0.246004
University, no certificate,
diploma or degree
3.73 4.06 0.33 0.999542
University or college cer-
tificate or diploma
5.74 7.25 1.51 2.230979
Bachelor or first profes-
sional degree
12.37 17.09 4.72 3.881611
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Table 12: Canada 1991
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
Below grade 5 0.6 2.15 1.55 1.476947
Grades 5-8 4.18 6.12 1.94 -0.261591
Grades 9-13 19.49 14.74 -4.75 -1.963603
High school graduation
certificate
16.89 13.61 -3.28 -2.491766
Trades certificate or
diploma
4.76 3.18 -1.58 -2.101959
Non-university without
trades or college certificate
or diploma
7.14 6.88 -0.26 -1.444174
Non-university with trades
certificate or diploma
8.57 7.59 -0.98 -0.907426
Non-university with col-
lege certificate or diploma
12.88 11.4 -1.48 -0.288642
University, no certificate,
diploma or degree
3.88 5.04 1.16 0.578965
University or college cer-
tificate or diploma
6.15 7.55 1.4 1.2665
Bachelor or first profes-
sional degree
11.39 13.79 2.4 1.635588
Certificate or diploma
above bachelor level
1.64 2.29 0.65 1.614603
Master’s degree 2.17 4.53 2.36 1.514125
Doctoral degree 0.24 0.9 0.66 1.162431
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Table 13: Canada 2001
Educational Level Native Immigrant Phi H-P Phi
Distribution Distribution
Below grade 5 0.64 1.36 0.72 1.120468
Grades 5-8 1.75 3.47 1.72 0.194037
Grades 9-13 15.32 13.49 -1.83 -0.932627
High school graduation
certificate
14.65 12.2 -2.45 -1.696779
Trades certificate or
diploma
3.82 2.55 -1.27 -1.984356
Non-university without
trades or college certificate
or diploma
7.7 5.54 -2.16 -2.057908
Non-university with trades
certificate or diploma
8.94 7.79 -1.15 -1.822807
Non-university with col-
lege certificate or diploma
17.18 13.49 -3.69 -1.235469
University, no certificate,
diploma or degree
3.53 4.5 0.97 0.08409
University or college cer-
tificate or diploma
6.9 8.6 1.7 1.288592
Bachelor or first profes-
sional degree
14.6 18.17 3.57 1.973713
Certificate or diploma
above bachelor level
1.88 2.28 0.4 1.940832
Master’s degree 2.77 5.48 2.71 1.789473
Doctoral degree 0.31 1.08 0.77 1.348742
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